In this note we consider the preferences of a profit maximizing firm for international ownership in a world in which firms compete in an international Cournot oligopoly, and in which countries use strategic trade policy. We find that firms prefer national ownership and show that full indigenisation occurs in the equilibrium.
Introduction
In this note we consider the preferences of a proÞt maximizing Þrm for international ownership in a world in which Þrms compete in an international Cournot oligopoly, and in which countries use strategic trade policy. We Þnd that Þrms prefer national ownership and show that full indigenisation occurs in equilibrium.
It has been noted earlier that internationally dispersed Þrm ownership matters for countries' incentives vis-a-vis Þrms in their own country. Barros and Cabral (1994) study merger in an international framework showing that foreign ownership should change a regulator's decisions if the regulator cares about national welfare. 1 In the context of strategic trade policy, Dick (1993) and Welzel (1995) study two-Þrm-two-country models and show that countries' incentives to subsidize home Þrms may decrease in the presence of international ownership. Dick supports this theoretical result also by data from US industries. 2 We endogenize the ownership structure of Þrms if this structure is chosen with the aim of maximizing the Þrm's proÞt and allow for the general case of n Þrms in n countries. Firms maximize proÞts and choose the international composition of their shareholders. Our main result is that fully national ownership is an equilibrium phenomenon. This Þnding may con-1 Similarly, Konrad and Lommerud (2001) show that a foreign investor may protect a larger share of the returns of foreign direct investment from conÞscation by an indigenisation strategy. Indigenisation changes the host country's weights regarding the redistribution beneÞts and the production efficiency cost of extortionary taxation. Our result does not follow trivially since an increase in the share of international owners has countervailing effects. It is not clear which effect
dominates. Let us assume that all Þrms are fully nationally owned and that one Þrm, say Þrm A in country A deviates from that by raising some capital in country B. This will have the following effects.
• The incentives for country B to subsidize their own Þrms are reduced due to cannibalization. C.p., this is of beneÞt for Þrm A.
• The incentives for country A to subsidize Þrm A are reduced because some of Þrm A's proÞts now ßow into country B. C.p., this harms Þrm A.
We are not able to determine which effects are dominating in general, but we show that starting from full indigenization, the negative effect of going international overpowers the advantage that is caused by the Þrst effect.
Hence, full national ownership is an equilibrium phenomenen. This, however, does not rule out that there are (potentially fully mixed) equilibria where given the results developed here, these may have a common interest that none of them sells a block of shares to a foreign investor. More precisely, domestic shareholders and investors should be willing to pay a premium above the willingness-to-pay of a foreign investor because foreign ownership will reduce the market value of the Þrm. Also, it seems reasonable to assume that management have some sort of control when new capital is raised, for example, by the type of investor relations policy chosen, or the choice of accounting standards (national norms or US norms), and related to this, by the choice of the stock exchange at which the Þrm is listed.
Finally, in some cases our results might also give reason for public Þrms to go private again, a move that has gained some popularity in Europe. 3 
International ownership and strategic trade
We consider a symmetric situation using the standard strategic trade policy framework by Brander and Spencer (1985) but with n Þrms in n countries, Þrm i being located in country i. Up to the point where we depart, the framework is well known and can be reviewed brießy. Firms produce quantities x i of a homogenous good which is exported to some other country that behaves passively with respect to its imports. For ease of notation, we assume linear demand and cost, the benchmark case for most oligopoly models. Without loss of generality we normalize marginal costs to zero and inverse demand to 3 See, for example, Time Magazine from October 23, 2000 (Vol. 156).
where s i is the subsidy paid to Þrm i and chosen by government i in order to maximize national welfare. The countries Þrst choose their subsidies simultaneously, and once these are given and observed by everyone, the Þrms choose their quantities. For given subsidies we obtain
with S = P j s j . Hence,
Anticipating (2), countries choose subsidies. Country j's welfare is given by a weighted sum of the proÞts of those Þrms that are at least partly owned by citizens in country j minus the subsidies paid to Þrm j. Using (2) we can write welfare as
where α i j is the share of Þrm i owned by citizens of country j. Differentiating (4) with respect to s j we derive country j's Þrst-order condition as
For the case of pure national ownership everywhere, i.e. if all α 
while the Þrst-order condition for country i which hosts and subsidizes the internationally owned Þrm i becomes
Solving the simultaneous equations (see the appendix) shows that the equilibrium subsidies depend only the total amount of capital Þrm i seeks abroad.
So, let ε = P h6 =i α i h . With this we get
and
Substituting into (3) we can now write Þrm i's proÞt as a function of ε, namely
Taking the Þrst derivative of this expression we
Þnd that
Hence, it does not pay for Þrm i to deviate from pure national ownership.
Proposition 1 Pure national ownership (full indigenisation) is an equilibrium.
Discussion
In this paper we analyzed the relationship between international ownership and equilibrium proÞts for Þrms which compete in an international oligopoly in which countries use strategic trade policy. We show for the linear benchmark case that Þrms maximize their proÞts if they preserve national ownership.
Intuitively, internationally dispersed ownership reduces the subsidy a Þrm receives from its home country. This lowers the Þrm's proÞts. However, this effect is counteracted as international diversiÞcation of equity also reduces the other countries' subsidies to their own Þrms. We show that the direct effects of reduced subsidies in the home country dominates the beneÞcial effects of reduced subsidies to the Þrms in all other countries. Hence, fully domestic ownership of all Þrms occurs in the equilibrium.
The analysis highlights a strategic reason why Þrms prefer national ownership. Several simplifying restrictions have been made to make the analysis tractable, e.g., linear demand, constant marginal cost, complete and perfect information etc. Deviations from these assumptions may in some cases generate effects that add or substract to the beneÞt of national ownership but will typically not make the effect disappear. Two of these assumptions are particularly worthwhile to be discussed brießy.
One potentially restrictive assumption in our analysis is the symmetry of Another assumption that deserves some discussion is that of Cournot competition for which the Þrms' choice variables are strategic substitutes.
As is known from Eaton and Grossman (1986), Bertrand competition, where actions are strategic complements, can lead to strategic trade taxes. Firms may then want to reduce their governments' incentives to use such taxes against them, and international portfolio diversiÞcation could be a means for achieving this goal. The crucial question therefore is whether Þrms' choice variables are indeed strategic substitutes as assumed here. As has been argued by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) , this can be the case even if Þrms compete in prices at some later stage of the game, if they Þrst make capacity choices. Similarly, strategic substitutability can be caused if Þrms compete in R&D contests prior to a price or quantity game. A more general set-up that also lends some support to the case of strategic substitutability and strategic trade subsidies for a wide parameter range is provided by Maggi (1996) .
As mentioned in the introduction our results may contribute to explaining the well-documentated home-country bias for public Þrms 4 and, as private
Þrms might have better control over the international composition of equity why public Þrms decide to go private again. A few hypotheses that could be tested are as follows:
• As private Þrms and public Þrms with large shareholders can more easily control the international composition of ownership of the Þrm, private Þrms should be owned domestically to a larger extent than public Þrms, and the share of international ownership in domestic Þrms should be larger if the domestic ownership is more dispersed.
• We considered Cournot competition in which a country's strategic trade policy beneÞts the Þrms that are located in this country. This reverses with Bertrand competition, and, therefore, the predictions this paper makes on the home bias in international portfolio composition hold for the case of Cournot markets.
• Considering the general equilibrium aspects of strategic trade policy, strategic trade policy focusses on markets with much market power.
Hence, the home bias in international portfolio composition should be particularly strong in Þrms with few Cournot competitors.
• Improved international arrangements to detect and ban strategic trade policy also remove the indigenization incentives that may be caused by 4 Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) survey and disqualify some of the competing explainations, such as high transaction cost of trading foreign securities, exchange rate risks, speciÞc risk correlations between non-traded and traded assets, and contribute an adverse selection explanation, according to which foreigners' lack of knowledge can result also in a less efficient use of real resources. Their explanation and the explanation given here are, of course, not mutually exclusive. 
Appendix
In this appendix we derive equations (8) and (9) . Using ε = P h6 =i α i h and ε h = α i h we can rewrite (6) as S = − 2ε h + 2ε h s i n + 2ε h s i + 1 + s h n + s h − n −2ε h − 1 + n and (7) as S = 1 + s i n + s i + 2εs i n − n + 2εn + 2s i εn 2 1 − n + 2εn Equating the two right-hand sides and solving for s h we get
Using the deÞnition of S we can write
Substituting back into the Þrst-order condition (7) we get s i = n − 1 − 2εn 2εn 3 − 2εn 2 + n 2 + 1 and S = n 2εn 2 + n − 4εn − 1 − 2ε 2εn 3 − 2εn 2 + n 2 + 1 .
